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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS. — *Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*; *Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL.

Logic and Psychology — Further Views. G. H. HOWISON. *Psych. Rev.*, III, 6, pp. 652-657.

This article is a reply to Dr. Stratton's criticism of the relation between logic and psychology (*Psych. Rev.*, III, 3, pp. 313-320). Dr. Stratton in that paper showed how Aristotle's *Logic* had been for many centuries considered a finished work, and that modern psychology is in the right when it points out that there are many judgments which do not take the syllogistic form, and that the old formal logic must give way to the new logic. But he contends that psychology is wrong in making an attempt to treat logic as a department of psychology. This point of view claims that logic is to be a psychology of judgment and reasoning, while psychology proper is restricted to less complicated processes of mind. This classification of logic, which makes it simply a psychology of complex processes of mind, Dr. Stratton regards as unjustifiable. In such a classification of the sciences, he says, either logic loses its "logical aspect," or psychology a part of its field. Psychology should not be excluded from judgment and reasoning, and logic should not be treated as a natural science. Logic and psychology are different sciences; they have different ends and different methods. Logic is "an attempt to develop a principle of criticism," but psychology aims at giving a naturalistic account of mental events. Logic formulates *norms* to distinguish the consistent from the inconsistent, and neglects all the mental imagery as such, which may have led to the conclusion. A logical judgment implies certain premises, and these lead to a conclusion "just such and so." For psychology, judgments are made without premises, and the same premises, as mental states, produce different results in different minds. — Dr. Howison regards the separation of logic and psychology as unwarranted. If logic presupposes psychology, then, says Dr. Howison, they are not so distinct as the view of Dr. Stratton would seem to indicate. The source and the authority of logical canons are found only in psychology, not obser-

rational psychology but rational psychology. Logic is dependent on psychology, if the latter is regarded as the science of the soul in general.

EDWIN P. ROBINS.

Some Problems of Conception. L. T. HOBHOUSE. *Mind*, No. 22, pp. 145-163.

Thought is essentially a movement, and conception is only one among the elements of thought; hence the concept must not be isolated from the context in which it is found. To determine what conception is, we must look to the experience out of which it arises. Conception implies comparison, the basis of which is supplied by points of resemblance in the empirical order. Comparison involves abstraction, for in order to compare we must abstract, and thus, at least partially, destroy the empirical order. This act of abstraction, however, if followed out, is seen to involve something more positive than mere abstraction. Elements are singled out from the context, and recognized or *known* as what they are, reconstructed, we may say, with reference to the totality in which they appear; and this is analysis. While generalization is thus based on comparison, analysis of the order of reality furnishes the content to be made general. The content may be regarded in any one of three ways: (1) as the common quality, (2) as the mere expression of resemblance between individuals, (3) as the totality of the experience in which it occurs. In any case the common content reduces itself to quality. There are two resulting views of the concept, according as the content is taken to be (1) the abstract quality which remains always unaffected by differences, or (2) content containing the element of identity amid differences. In the latter case the attributes, together with the common element, are regarded as modifications of the quality itself. The author finds that these two ways of viewing the concept constitute fundamental differences in the use which we make of the concept in actual knowledge. In opposition to the abstract concept, he opposes the organic concept, contrasting the two in their relation to species, classification, inference, deduction, and essence. He concludes that the organic concept is affiliated, though not in all respects, to the Aristotelian essence.

CARL V. TOWER.

Le principe de non-contradiction comme principe dialectique. L. WEBER. *Rev. Ph.*, XXII, 3, pp. 252-279.

Pure identity is given only in the positing of being. The judgment *A is A* introduces distinction, since it has two terms, subject and predicate. Every judgment is a determination of being, but in form is an identity; hence arises a contradiction between form and content. Is this contradiction real or apparent? If *A is A* is contradictory, then *A is B* is contradictory, for it rests on identity. Identity as the unity of two terms is, therefore, impossible; but we may consider judgment as a particular case of the relation of substance and attribute. If we say 'Being has

properties,' this relation proves unthinkable. If we next say 'Being is appearance,' this is contradictory, for appearance presupposes being which appears. Again we may say 'Being is representation; its *esse* is *percipi*'; but representation implies subject and object, and thought is this unity. We may now say, 'Being is thought.' But taken in itself, this judgment is only a particular case of *A is A*. If, then, the judgment of identity is self-negating, every judgment, even the judgment of the denial of identity, is void. Besides, every denial of identity presupposes it. Contradiction is, therefore, only appearance. This appearance arises through abstract analysis, which breaks up the judgment into separate phases, due to the use of language: the two terms are first distinguished and then they are united. But judgment is not an arbitrary synthesis of independent terms; it is essentially an indivisible unity, an act reducible to nothing simpler, the identity of subject and predicate, not pure identity, but the identity of relation. No judgment is in itself contradictory, though it may be absurd (*e.g.*, *A is non-A*); contradiction arises in ratiocination. A judgment expresses the relation of terms which exist only in the judgment. A term taken out of this relation is indeterminate and simply nothing. In ratiocination, on the contrary, the elements are judgments which have a value in themselves. The premises are not absorbed in the conclusion, and contradiction can arise between the premises and the conclusion. Non-contradiction is thus a principle of the understanding, and may be stated as follows: A relation is valid, or ratiocination is correct, only on condition that the conclusion does not take the form *A is non-A*, the mere appearance of judgment; or the relation is impossible when the conclusion in relation to the premises takes the form *A is non-A*. This principle does not show that a judgment is true or false, but only whether a conclusion from given premises is valid or not. It is a principle of criticism, negative only, a rule for the understanding as a faculty of judgment.

EDWIN P. ROBINS.

Die analytische Methode und die Selbstständigkeit der Philosophie.

R. V. SCHUBERT-SOLDERN. V. f. w. Ph., XXI, 2, pp. 147-156.

With regard to the question whether philosophy is an independent science, there are three views. (1) It is independent, and its task is the deduction of the particular from the universal. (2) It is not independent; it simply groups together the conclusions reached by the other sciences. (3) It is an independent science; its task is neither to deduce the general from the particular nor to derive the particular from the general, but to establish the presuppositions of all sciences. — The error of the first theory is that it forgets that the universal can be found only in the particular. The second theory overlooks the fact that the particular is, in a sense, a combination of simple elements which are universals. The third theory is the author's own. Philosophy must discover the simple elements, and

determine what combinations of them are possible, before the particular sciences can do their work. The process of finding the elements is analytic; that of determining their possible combinations is synthetic. The two processes are usually included under the term 'deduction'; but the author prefers to call the method of philosophy 'analytic,' while he retains the term 'inductive' for the method of the particular sciences. The analytic method is concerned with coexistence, the inductive with succession; but all investigation of the successive presupposes an analysis of the coexistent.

ELLEN B. TALBOT.

Ueber psychologische und logische Urtheilstheorien. WILHELM JERUSALEM. V. f. w. Ph., XXI, 2, pp. 157-190.

In this article the author seeks to explain and defend the theory advanced in his book, *Die Urteilsfunktion*. Critics have regarded the work as a contribution to *logic*, but it is really a *psychological* investigation; and the article is chiefly concerned with showing the possibility and necessity of such a psychological inquiry. Psychology asks what judgment *is*; logic, what it *signifies*. The logical doctrine of judgment abstracts from all emotional elements, from the circumstances under which the judgment is made, and from the thinker; the psychological doctrine is concerned with all these factors. Moreover, while psychology has to do with all forms of judgment, logic deals simply with what the author calls 'concept judgments'; 'judgments of intuition' (*Anschauung*) and 'judgments of inner perception' cannot become objects of logical investigation. The article contains a table of the various forms of judgment, and a brief discussion of some criticisms of *Die Urteilsfunktion*. ELLEN B. TALBOT.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

Psychische Präsenzzeit. L. W. STERN. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., XIII, 4, 5, pp. 325-349.

The psychological 'present' is not a cross section of consciousness, not an abstraction, an unextended interval between the past and the future. It is a concrete mental state whose content is grasped by a single act of apprehension (*Auffassungsakt*). It is the content (*Inbegriff*) of temporal-spatial relations that can be the object of direct perception. The time-present (*Jetztzeit*) is analogous to the space-present (*Hiersein*). Both are extended. There is within the temporal present an 'earlier' and 'later,' as there is in perceived space a 'right' and a 'left,' a 'nearer' and a 'farther'; but there is in the temporal present no 'past' and 'future' any more than there is in the local present an 'absent.' A 'momentary conscious-whole' does not refer to a content which lasts only an 'instant,' but to one whose parts, simultaneous and successive, are grasped together.—Succession within the 'present' may appear to consciousness, and yet the integrity of the unitary

state be preserved, as in following a melody. — The direct perception of time cannot be given without temporal succession in consciousness. But in a single moment we may hold symbols expressing time relations. Here we must distinguish the time-idea (*Zeitvorstellung*) from the direct intuition of time (*Zeitanschauung*). The time idea may be a symbol expressive of time without its direct perception. Time relations (*e.g.*, duration, succession, rhythm, rapidity, acceleration) can be known only as they come within the psychological 'present,' *i.e.*, are immediately perceived. These contents of direct perception have been dwelt upon (as phenomena of the 'time sense') much more than the unitary state within which they exist, *i.e.*, the 'temporal present.' — We bring the past and future into direct perception by schematizing them and including them "foreshortened" within the present, *e.g.*, in singing when the mind anticipates the score. By this use of perspective a long period of time may be represented in a unitary act of consciousness. — In judgments of Identity, Similarity, Difference, and the like, we have the two terms brought together in the present. Where such judgments are made from direct perception, there is no memory image of the first term required to appear along with the second. Two successive tones are apprehended in just the same way as two simultaneous colors. Primary memory is really not memory at all, but a case of direct perception with successive terms. — The *duration* value of the 'present' is difficult to determine. The 'span' of consciousness determined by successive sounds is deceptive, because foreshortening (*v. sup.*) comes in. In consequence, the actual length of the unitary consciousness may be less than the objective measure indicates. — No *general* value for the 'present' can be given. There are several variables here, as *e.g.*, the quantity and quality of the contents, and the degree of mental energy. There is no *maximal*, because the limits are fleeting and indefinite, and the temporal projection just noted is hard to estimate. Every conscious act has, however, an *optimal* value, a best time for completing itself. This adequate time varies with the contents. That everything has its time is psychologically true, *i.e.*, there is a certain time required for an impression to come to its full development. This optimal value has been investigated experimentally with empty and filled intervals and rhythms. The optimal time may appear subjectively, as the most agreeable time for completing a process, or, objectively, as offering the most favorable conditions for an act of consciousness. The latter appears in reaction experiments, where the interval between the signal and reaction is most favorable for the adaptation of the attention.

I. M. BENTLEY.

The Psychology of Sufficient Reason. W. M. URBAN. Psych. Rev., IV, 4, pp. 361-373.

In genetic psychology we are warranted in extending the doctrine of selection according to the principle of utility into the sphere of the higher

knowledge processes. In reflex movement we find stimulus and reaction ; in the higher apperceptive functions we have an ideal and emotional complex which gathers about the stimulus. The number of possible complexes of ideas and emotions is practically infinite. We can, therefore, express the relation between motive and will-act, and between the subjective ground of a judgment and the judgment itself, as that of 'sufficient reason,' but not necessary cause, as in stimulus and reaction. In the lower sphere, there is the law of autogeneity of ends ; in the higher, the law of heterogeneity of ends. The presence of the latter law is due to the imaginative processes. By 'imagination' is meant that general element in all apperceptive processes which selectively projects ideas before consciousness in an emotional unity. These processes tend to reproduce reality. The idea and motor expression are both results of a primal process of imagination. When the reality feeling is intense we have an act of will ; otherwise an analysis of the ideal content. What determines whether the complex is to result in an act of will or not ? The principle of utility solves the problem. The primary type of the imaginative process is that in which the affective side prevails and action follows. Only by degrees have imaginative processes arisen in which attention is turned to analyzing the ideal content. The relations thus developed are of general worth or truth. All imaginative processes tend to result in will acts, but all do not correspond to reality, and selection is made on this basis. The reflective processes are the necessary results when natural reaction is hindered. Thus arises gradually a body of independent truth, which is only indirectly of practical utility. It is interesting to note that Kant and Herbart placed the subjective sufficiency of judgments in the imaginative process, although for them 'imagination' was really a metaphysical term.

W. MANAHAN.

ETHICAL.

The Conception of Society as an Organism. J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

Int. J. E., VII, 4, pp. 414-434.

The object of the article is, "without dogmatically maintaining the view that society is a mere means, to argue that there is nothing in Hegelian metaphysics which compels or entitles us to assert that it is anything more." That the nature of society is organic is not a very accurate description of Hegel's own view ; for a more detailed treatment of the subject we must look to his successors. Professor J. S. Mackenzie's statement, in his *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, is taken as typical and criticised. (1) To say of society, as this writer does, that the relation of its parts is intrinsic, does not establish its organic nature, since the proposition would be equally true of any real system, whether organic or not. (2) It is useless and misleading to call any unity organic, unless we are prepared to maintain that it (and not something at present contained in it) is an end to itself and to its

own parts ; an organic unity is "a unity which is the end of its parts." In this sense, we are compelled by the facts to deny that the society of the present is organic ; it is not the end of the individuals composing it. "Each of us is more than the society which unites us, because there is in each of us the longing for a perfection which that society can never realize." Nor (3) can we say that social progress is always and necessarily in the direction of a more organic unity, since individualization is as necessary to perfection as unification, and experience alone can tell us in which direction progress lies. If "only in a perfect unity could perfect individuals exist," it is also true that "none but perfect individuals could unite in a perfect unity."

J. S.

The Place of Pleasure in a System of Ethics. FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE. Int. J. E., VII, 4, pp. 475-486.

The psychological and the material aspects of pleasure must be distinguished, — or pleasure as a mere quality of psychological activity, and as a quality of the thing desired. Psychological hedonism is necessarily egoistic and non-moral. Only in its material aspect can pleasure have any place in a system of ethics. The results of such a view of pleasure as an ethical principle are : (1) the obligatoriness of the higher desires, as possessing superior value to the lower ; (2) the equal reality and higher obligatoriness of the pleasures of society. Yet (3) it remains true that the supreme moral desire of the individual is a desire for his highest happiness, and that it is impossible to conceive of such happiness except in terms of society. Highest happiness is thus the *summum bonum*, not in the psychological sense, but in the material sense, of the most valued objects of our desires, both their possession and their use. To the question, why the individual conceives his highest happiness to be something in which he as an individual can by no possibility actually share, the only answer is that moral activity is itself one of the factors which, in man's development, have helped to determine what highest happiness is. The question which ethical systems have to meet, would seem then to be, not what is the *summum bonum*, for that is happiness, but what is the distinctive mark of moral activity, what characterizes man as a moral being. And the only intelligible conception of morality is "conduct thought to be universally binding under the conditions of human life." Moral values are what they are because they are human values ; they are the product of man's total development. The alternative is between a pleasure theory of conduct and a moral theory of conduct.

J. S.

The Treatment of Prisoners. WILLIAM DOUGLAS MORRISON. Int. J. E., VII, 4, pp. 448-463.

The present methods of penal administration are, by common consent, a failure ; they not only fail to reform offenders, but produce a deteriorating

effect upon them. The only result of severe punishments is to still farther degrade and demoralize men who are already degraded and demoralized. Force, no matter how severe, will not keep down crime. The true method of diminishing crime is to pluck it up by the roots ; and the only way to pluck it up by the roots is to alleviate the social disorders by which it is produced. Yet better penal laws and a better prison system would tend to minimize crime. The most urgent need in the matter of penal law is to increase the number of substitutes for imprisonment, and to make the present substitutes more elastic. Forced labor without imprisonment, the American system of probation, and the combination of fine with imprisonment, are discussed and advocated. As regards prison discipline, the self-respect and moral being of the prisoner ought to be developed, rather than crushed, and to this end the approximation of prison discipline to industrial discipline is urged. For the residuum of hopeless criminals, asylum treatment should be substituted for penal treatment.

J. S.

METAPHYSICAL.

La philosophie de Secrétan. F. PILLON. Rev. Ph., XXII, 3, pp. 225–251.

Secrétan's chief works are : *La philosophie de Leibniz*, *La philosophie de la liberté*, *La civilisation et la croyance*, *Précis élémentaire de philosophie*. His whole system is the philosophy of liberty, which, for him, is the philosophy of Christianity. God is the free beginning of all things, and the question is, how to think of the world of experience as a creation of God. God is absolutely free, and without freedom there is no meaning in the words, 'God,' 'man,' 'good.' Philosophy falls into two divisions : (1) Regressive, the determination of the Absolute Being ; (2) Progressive, an explanation therefrom of the facts in nature and history. The Absolute is free, and the formula of its liberty is : *Je suis ce que je veux* ; but in itself, before the actuality of any wish, it is God *en puissance*, and not God *en acte*. The Absolute through its freedom creates its divine attributes and the world, and relates itself to its creation, and thus becomes God. The Absolute becomes God in creating the world, and it created the world because it wished to be God, to manifest its divinity. But why does the Absolute will to be God ? What is the motive of creation ? The motive cannot be a need or a duty, for both are inconsistent with the nature of the Absolute. The motive is not for the Absolute, but for the creature ; it is love for the creature. The will is, therefore, to produce the best possible creation, a creature in the likeness of God, a free, creative spirit. An abstract logic makes divine omniscience and omnipotence inconsistent with the liberty of the creature. Abstract logic must not be trusted too far, but

if there is a real inconsistency, then the divine attributes in their full extent must be surrendered. Self-limitation of God for the liberty of the creature manifests his real freedom. Since the creature is free, he has the liberty to develop or destroy his freedom ; but it is his nature to be free, and freedom is his duty ; and this one duty to personality is the basis of all duties. The actuality of freedom, however, implies self-consciousness and the fact that the individual wills to be a free being, distinct from God. But the creature cannot be separated from God by his own desire without being separated from him in substance (freedom), the root of his own being. Annihilation would be the result of this act. To overcome this antithesis, the creature must will God whenever he wills himself. He distinguishes himself from God in order to unite with him. This is love. Love for God is therefore the law of the creature, and love for the creature is the motive for creation. This conception unites theism and pantheism. If creation is in the image of God and is pure spirit, whence the visible world? Secrétan says it was not the first creation, but presupposes sin, and is posterior to the fall. The human race, all living beings, and all phenomena are the result of sin. Sin is the opposition of the will of the creature to the will of God, and must annihilate the freedom (*i. e.*, essence, existence) of the creature, if God wills no opposition to his law. But God is averse to the creature's destruction, and also wills to repel all contradiction. Thus God has two wills ; and two opposed wills in absolute liberty are two persons, Father and Son. The visible creation is not from the Absolute ; "it is rather a rampart raised against his wrath, in a word, a means of restoration, the work of the Son." The result of the fall is the means of salvation.

EDWIN P. ROBINS.

Philosophic Faith. MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND. Int. J. E., VII, 4, pp. 464-474.

This is a sketch of the answer of idealistic philosophy to the question : What is religious faith ? It must be assumed that there is an order in the universe ; practical belief in that order is implied in our every thought and act. This practical belief in an order which is not presented to sense is faith, a faith which is *not* opposed to reason. It is, moreover, the essential faith of Christianity. The theological explanation of this faith in the spirituality of the universe which resolves it into a belief in the miraculous, has been confounded with the faith itself. The scientific or agnostic dissolution of it is equally futile. Philosophy alone can justify it. The Christian doctrine of the spirituality of the universe and of our participation as spirits in it, has been the common property of idealistic philosophers from Plato's time to our own.

J. S.

HISTORICAL.

The Philosopher of Harmony and Fire. CHAS. P. PARKER. New World, VI, 2, pp. 291-307.

The union of contraries in the bow is what gives it its power. In stringing the bow the archer is obliged to use opposite pressures at the two ends; the tension at the one end is equalized by the tension at the other, and this equilibrium of energy gives the bow its power. The union of contraries is the very nature of the bow. The bow is typical of the operations of nature and of the structure of the entire cosmos. The lyre, like the bow, is constituted by this pull at one end and the counterbalancing of it by resistance at the other end of the string. In the union of opposite tensions lies the power of the lyre to produce music. The essence of music and the essence of life lies in the union of contraries. When Heraclitus declared that "there was always, and is, and ever will be, an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and quenching in measures," he meant something analogous to the metres and rhythms familiar to him in epic and lyric poetry, in music and the dance. He meant that fire, which is the essential nature of the cosmos, moves rhythmically, that its changes are rational and orderly. Mr. Parker finds in the Fragments support for the belief that Heraclitus was full of light-heartedness and happiness, with perhaps a good deal of aristocratic scorn for the follies of the multitude. He finds the title 'weeping philosopher' totally inapplicable to Heraclitus. He regards his philosophy as a metaphysic of optimism, — the world is good and ruled by right reason. "War," to be sure, "is the father of all things," but it exists for, and issues in, harmony. He notes especially four points: (1) the Fragments which teach the identity of the individual and divine λόγος are of doubtful authenticity, originating possibly as late as the first Christian centuries; (2) the characterization of the Heracliteans in the *Theaetetus* is untrue of Heraclitus himself, and can be applied only to some disciple who developed the doctrine of change to an extreme; (3) the imaginative and musical elements of the Heraclitean philosophy dropped out when it was transformed in the minds of the Stoics; (4) Heraclitus did not analyze the notion of good into its elements, as did Socrates, and maintained no doctrine of its relativity or that evil was necessary to good in the production of harmony. Heraclitus was essentially a physical philosopher, and found the world full of light and reason.

W. A. H.

Der Wissenschaftsbegriff bei H. Lotze. O. KREBS. V. f. w. Ph., XXI, i, pp. 26-78; 2, pp. 191-226.

In philosophy we find systems, which claim to be scientific, mutually contradicting each other. In order to form a conception of science, the author thinks it necessary to treat the matter historically, first finding what views

have been held by writers of eminence, and then critically constructing his own conception in agreement or disagreement with these. He chooses Lotze as the most important philosopher of our century, and the successful opponent of materialism. "Science," says Lotze, "is not the truth itself, for that is valid always, and does not need to be constructed by the efforts of man, but it is knowledge of the truth." There are two kinds of truth. The first is immediate, and consists of vague glimmerings by which we are possessed, but which we do not possess. The second is consciously possessed and logically arranged. Science is of the latter kind. Our author objects that immediate truth, as apart from cognition, is without content, and is no truth at all. For Lotze, immediate truth is *a priori*, in the sense that it does not need to be established, but merely developed by experience. As the presupposition of science, it is, however, directed in its development by experience, which occasions its application. This very fact, it is urged, shows that truth is an historical development, an abstraction from experience, used as the presupposition of science. Lotze appeals to history for the recognition of the validity of these fundamental truths, but Krebs does not accept this criterion. On the contrary, he affirms that the presuppositions of science prove their truth in the measure that they solve problems of science, and do not involve themselves in contradiction. Consistency with the fundamental assumptions is regarded by Lotze as the criterion of mediated, demonstrable truth. When secondary truth is brought into logical and causal relation with necessary assumptions, science results. Krebs, however, regards these presuppositions as derived from experience, and to be retained only so long as they serve to harmonize the facts. Lotze distinguishes the form of science from that of art, while he identifies their contents. Art needs no enrichment from science, and it gets into difficulty if it borrows scientific form. Science seeks to prophesy what will be the result under given conditions. Its aim is a practical one. It does not seek truth merely for its own sake. While Lotze holds that science is monistic and falls under one principle, the unity of nature and spirit, yet, it is objected, he refuses to apply one principle to both physics and mind. This is not monism, nor is it monism when he brings in the freedom of the soul, and so destroys the equality of spirit and nature before the law. While exhorting science not to be prejudiced by feeling, he points out that feeling and belief are the completion and summit of life. Krebs adds that belief should, however, retain nothing which is found contrary to science, and that the latter need not be destroyed to make room for the former. Lotze defines religion and science differently; the one he regards as made up of assertory propositions and particular facts, the other as characterized by hypothetical general judgments. It is suggested by Krebs that science starts from assertory propositions, but later takes on the hypothetical form for the purposes of logic. Finally, only in so far as Lotze will grant that the scientific and aesthetic come from principles essentially the same, is he justified in grounding both in

the supersensible, God. Lotze regards metaphysical presuppositions and logic as the subjective side of immediate truth; their source is the aesthetic spirit. But he has not, Krebs concludes, consistently shown the origin and certainty of these first principles. — The second article is occupied chiefly with the consideration of Lotze's position in regard to the subjectivity or objectivity of knowledge. Lotze often talks like a subjective idealist; but more frequently, particularly in his later works, seems to maintain the existence of a world-in-itself distinct from the phenomenal world. Sometimes he appears to think that we may have actual knowledge of things-in-themselves; usually, however, he denies this, but at the same time insists that this subjectivity is no defect, that the so-called phenomenal is higher and more valuable than the noumenal. Lotze's attempt to explain the relation of logical thinking to the psychological-mechanical train of thought, leads him into difficulties. Logical thinking criticises and corrects what is given in experience; but thought itself sometimes errs, and must in turn be corrected by experience. The relation between logical thinking and the metaphysical categories in Lotze's system, is hard to make out. The logical forms seem to be the ectypes of the metaphysical categories. Lotze fails to explain *why* we apply these logical forms to the given at all; and when he tries to show how it is that we apply them *correctly*, he is obliged to bring in a second act of thought, an act of comparison. Since this does not, like the first act of thought, produce a new *form*, he calls it 'receptivity'; but in so doing gives it the characteristic which is supposed to distinguish the psychological from the logical process.

ELLEN B. TALBOT.